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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

was "not determinative" of whether or not the section pertained to
venue.
The court noted the CWA's legislative history was unclear and not
unequivocal as to whether section 509(b) (1) pertained to jurisdiction
or venue. However, Industry petitioners did not raise this argument.
The court concluded that even if they had, it would not have found
such an argument persuasive.
The court held section 509(b) (1) determines venue, not
jurisdiction. Because venue objections could be waived and Industry
petitioners conceded proper venue was no longer an issue, the court
denied Industry petitioners' motion to dismiss.
SarahE. McCutcheon
Slinger Drainage, Inc. v. EPA, 237 F.3d 681 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding
the provision of the Clean Water Act that establishes the computation
of time for filing a notice of appeal determines whether the notice is
timely and not the federal rules of procedure).
Slinger Drainage ("Slinger") installed drainage tiles over a fiftyacre area that resulted in the discharge of pollutants into a wetland.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") subsequently filed an
administrative complaint against Slinger alleging a violation of section
301 (a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for failure to obtain a permit
before discharging pollutant into a wetland. The Administrative Law
Judge found Slinger liable and imposed a civil penalty of $90,000. The
Appeals Board upheld the fine, and Slinger brought this action to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The court ruled it had no jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits
because Slinger failed to timely file the notice of appeal. Under the
CWA, Slinger had thirty days to file its notice of appeal beginning on
the date the Appeals Board issued its order. Slinger filed its notice a
day late under the CWA provision. Slinger argued the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 26(a) ("Rule 26(a)") governed how
courts should compute the thirty-day period, and not the CWA.
Under Rule 26(a), the day the court issued its order is not calculated
in the time period, and Slinger's appeal would have been filed on
time.
The court held Rule 26(a) did not apply when Congress has
specified a particular method of counting in the statute itself and there
is no indication of a contrary congressional intention. The court
dismissed Slinger's appeal because the CWA clearly established the
computation of time.
Spencer L. Sears
United States v. A.J.S., Inc., No. CIV.A.00-0263-C, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17388 (E.D. La. Nov. 29, 2000) (denying summary judgment
motion concerning a mortgage foreclosure due to the existence of
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demonstrated disputed issues of material fact regarding the impact of
fresh water release onto the mortgaged property, thereby leading to a
defense of equitable estoppel).
AJ.S., Inc. ("AJ.S.") defaulted on its United States Government
("Government") mortgage payments. The Government claimed no
factual dispute regarding AJ.S.'s obligation to pay and filed a summary
judgment motion, thus allowing the Government to foreclose on the
mortgage. In response, AJ.S. argued that because its inability to pay
resulted directly from Government misrepresentation within the loan
agreement's Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), this fact
estopped the Government from mortgage foreclosure.
The EIS stated the release of fresh water from the Caernarvon
Fresh Water Diversion Project ("the Project") would neither adversely
affect nor impact the mortgaged property. AJ.S. relied on the
Government representations and took the proceeds from the loan to
develop an oyster habitat, plant oyster seedlings, and construct a reef
on the Project leases. However, the fresh water flow was greater than
the EIS anticipated and the value of the oyster leases plunged.
Accordingly, AJ.S. proffered the affidavits of two witnesses as
corroboration of its defense. Furthermore, plans to depose the
witnesses were in place at the time the Government filed the summary
judgment motion.
The court found AJ.S. demonstrated disputed issues of material
fact concerning its defense of equitable estoppel. Therefore, the court
held the Government's attempt to dispose of the case prior to the
depositions was premature and denied the summary judgment motion.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
L.B. Corp. v. Schweitzer-Mauduit Int'l, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D.
Mass. 2000) (holding, unless the parties were in commercial
transaction, Massachusetts General Law chapter 93A was inapplicable
to claims arising from: (1) subsurface pumping of a well that caused
damage to the adjacent property's building; and (2) unfair or
deceptive business practices).
L.B. Corp. ("L.B.") brought a diversity action seeking
compensatory damages in the amount of $400,000 from SchweitzerMauduit
Corp.
("Schweitzer")
and
Kimberly-Clark
Corp.
("Kimberly"). In 1984, Kimberly sold the Valley Industrial Park, a
fifteen-acre parcel, to L.B. Kimberly's subsidiary, Schweitzer, owned
the Valley Mill Landfill adjacent to the Valley Industrial Park. L.B.
claimed improper pumping of a Kimberly well ("Well No. 5") in 1993
caused its buildings to subside twelve inches and resulted in repeated
costly repairs between 1995 and 1998. In 1997, the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection informed L.B. that volatile

